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The federal role in mortgage insurance is 
more prominent than it needs to be.
NO. 318, JANUARY 2011
FINANCIAL SERVICESGovernments’ role in mortgage markets is pervasive. An active role is often justified on the ground
that home ownership is a fundamental good that governments should promote, and can do so
through active engagement in mortgage markets. However, critics worry that government
agencies may encourage excessive lending risks in the consumer marketplace, potentially creating
unmanageably large risks in financial markets. 
The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, CMHC, is the domestically dominant
residential housing policy vehicle. The Crown agency sells mortgage insurance, which federal law
requires be purchased by borrowers with downpayments of less than 20 percent of a home’s value.
CMHC’s mortgage insurance book now backstops mortgage lending equivalent to more than 30
percent of gross domestic product. While the net exposure is less than this, the arrangement
subjects Canadian taxpayers to large, ill-defined risks. 
This Commentarymakes the observation that there is no reason for federal taxpayers to be exposed
to large mortgage insurance liabilities. On the other hand, private insurers are able to manage
such exposures, provided that they are adequately capitalized, prudently managed and regulated,
and able to access liquid financial markets. Private insurers currently compete on the margins of
the mortgage insurance business, which is dominated by CMHC.
Accordingly, this Commentary recommends:
￿ That federal policy should limit public exposure to mortgage lending risks, by winding back
CMHC’s role in the provision of mortgage insurance, and allow private providers to take on a larger
role. The agency’s capital and staff would be well employed in reinsurance and securitization
functions that backed private market insurers.
￿ Independent of whether Ottawa pursues the first recommendation, Parliament should adopt
legislation that formally requires CMHC to comply with, and report on, compliance with OSFI
guidelines, so that market participants compete on level footing.
￿ Finally, Parliament should adopt legislation that would support covered bond issuance by domestic
financial institutions and clarify creditor arrangements in the event of the bankruptcy of a federally
regulated deposit-taking institution. Such legislation would allow those institutions to more readily
compete for low-cost capital in the international bond market and better serve the domestic
mortgage lending market.
These proposals would not affect the federal government’s ability to pursue financial stability
objectives, such as by setting guidelines on the terms and conditions of mortgage issuance, or
requirements for mortgage insurance. Nor would they constrain the government’s ability to
intervene in mortgage bond markets, as occurred during the recent financial crisis. This implies
that a range of federal  policy objectives may be pursued without incurring financial exposure for
taxpayers through direct participation in mortgage insurance.
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G
overnments’ role in housing
and, specifically, mortgage
markets has recently become
pervasive – and more controversial
than ever. As a result, in Canada and
the United States, there are continuing
concerns over the housing market
activities of Crown agencies and
government-sponsored enterprises.
The concerns range from whether
these agencies and enterprises have
done enough over the years to enhance
housing affordability, and sustain the
flow of mortgage lending to homebuyers,
to whether they have done too much.
Those in the “too much” camp argue
that the agencies and enterprises have
built up excessive lending risks in the
consumer marketplace, contributing
to the creation of price bubbles that
inevitably burst. The critics add that
the agencies and enterprises have also
created unmanageably large risks in
the broader financial marketplace.
This Commentary leans toward the view that
state involvement in housing markets, while perhaps
inevitable in the political sense, creates large risks
that need to be suitably managed – and have often
not been in the past and present. I trace the
government role in housing finance and show
how the risks to taxpayers have increased
significantly in dollar terms and relative to the
economy. Beyond the presumed benefits of
promoting home ownership, these activities have
had some clearly harmful and well-understood
consequences as well as other less well-understood
but also harmful consequences in world 
financial markets.
The rationale for government intervention in
housing markets lies largely in the view of shelter
as a human necessity. For social welfare reasons,
governments may wish to ensure that individuals
lacking in resources are able to find some form of
shelter. Government involvement in housing,
however, goes well beyond financial support for
the less well off. Many western countries have
public policies that support home ownership on
the grounds that homeowners contribute to a
stable society through positive ties to community,
family and work.
But governments’ activities in housing markets
have contributed to distortions in the economy
and greater risks in the financial sector, with
potentially large costs to the public. Specifically,
governments have stimulated more mortgage
lending than markets would otherwise demand
and have deliberately extended that lending –
particularly in the United States – to households
who clearly could not sustain it. 
That said, the events of 2007 and 2008
reminded governments that significant correlated
(or undiversifiable) financial market risks and
shocks do arise, originating in housing markets,
and that they may be beyond the capacity of
domestic financial institutions to absorb. This
arguably establishes the case for governments’
backstopping or reinsuring those risks, as they do
with deposit insurance, and as central banks do
when they act as lender of last resort. They would
in so doing offer a limited safety net for the
financial intermediation activities that diversify or
insure others’ lending risks, while ensuring that
private insurers bear costs that are proportional to
the risks they choose to underwrite.
Hence, in the wake of the recent financial
market disaster and with a cautionary eye on past
housing finance crises in Canada, I make several
recommendations. They include steps to reduce
taxpayers’ exposure to the risks associated with
mortgage lending, improve oversight of the key
agencies involved, and to modernize the legislative
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environment so that the competitive market may
more efficiently provide mortgage lending on
relatively safe commercial terms. One key step
would be for the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation (CMHC) to wind back, over time,
its mortgage insurance book. 
Such a shift would leave a role for CMHC to
backstop, or reinsure – for a risk-adjusted price –
the financing arrangements that support the
insurance contracts that cover the risk of ordinary
lending defaults. It would also limit government
policy to its more clearly justifiable economic role
– assisting in the managing of undiversifiable risks
that markets on their own, in times of financial
crisis, may not be able to manage well. Further,
this approach would leave unfettered the ability of
the federal government to regulate minimum
prudential standards for mortgage lending and
insurance. At the same time, it would not interfere
with governments’ abilities to purchase mortgage
assets when financial crises emerge, as during the
2008-2009 period.
Background 
Federal support for residential homebuyers
evolved in similar directions in Canada and the
US over the course of the 20
th century, in each
case beginning with the creation of agencies
intended to help low-income families to buy
homes.
1 And, in each case, the new agencies
became significant and persistent institutional
features of the mortgage lending, insurance and
securitization marketplaces.
The Canadian Context 
In Canada, the federal role in housing manifests
itself primarily through what is now called the
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation,
established as the Central Mortgage and Housing
Corporation in 1946 to facilitate housing for
returning war veterans. As with most organizations,
CMHC’s interpretation of its mandate – or the
expectations the agency’s political masters placed
on it – has steadily grown and its activities
expanded. The agency began by assisting in the
direct provision of low-cost rental and social
housing and other subsidy programs. In 1954,
CMHC entered the mortgage insurance business
on the belief that doing so would lower the cost
and enhance the availability of housing finance
(see MacGee 2010 and Box 1 for a description of
Canadian mortgage underwriting and insurance
rules and practices).
The agency’s activities in social housing greatly
expanded in the 1960s and 1970s. When CMHC
in the past encountered financial trouble, it was
primarily a result of direct assistance for home
ownership. The 1968 federal budget, 
for example, significantly increased funding for
CMHC’s direct lending program in support of
owner-occupied housing.
2 In 1970, Ottawa
announced a $200 million low-income housing
program, and increased CMHC’s scope for direct
mortgage lending “due to insufficient private
funds” (Hulchanski 1988).
The low-income housing program gained a
sister fund in 1970, the $100 million Assisted
Home Ownership Program (AHOP). Alongside
several income tax initiatives,
3 the federal
government introduced in 1975 and later that
year expanded funding for the Assisted Rental
Program (ARP), aimed at increasing the supply of
rental housing; funding for the AHOP increased
as well. Ottawa increased ARP funding again in
1977, and both programs were terminated in 1978.
This brief history is pertinent because, although
the numbers appear small now, the programs
affected many individuals’ borrowing and housing
choices and exposed taxpayers to losses. Those
1 In this Commentary, I focus on policies keyed to supporting homebuyers. I ignore direct and indirect support for low-income housing
construction and mostly leave tax-policy measures as matters to be discussed elsewhere.
2 Political oversight for these programs was the responsibility of then prime minister Pierre Trudeau and his first two housing ministers, 
Paul Hellyer and Robert Andras. See Hulchanski (1988) on which the history described here relies in part.
3 Among them were the Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan and the Multiple Unit Residential Building program. Both were eventually
terminated (in 1982, for RHOSP) and (1981 for MURB) and viewed retrospectively as expensive failures.Commentary 318 | 3
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choices were made in the context of a rising
inflation rate – whose consequences were poorly
understood at the time – and a directly related
rising interest rate environment. The commitments
families entered into, under AHOP in particular,
therefore became routinely untenable, in part
because of the 1980 to 1981 recession. After a
change of government in 1984, CMHC
announced that, primarily owing to defaults by
participants in the then-shuttered AHOP and
ARP schemes, its mortgage insurance fund
showed an actuarial deficit of nearly $800 million,
a large exposure for federal taxpayers at the time.
4
Multiple and conflicting objectives routinely 
have attached themselves to CMHC policy. In 
the 1970s, for example, the agency’s managers
used the terms and conditions under which
mortgage loans would be guaranteed as
macroeconomic management tools, on the belief
that macroeconomic fine tuning was an activity
compatible with the ordinary business of insuring
residential mortgage loans against borrower
defaults (Dodge 2008).
5
The motivations for these housing market
interventions were many. They have included
concerns about the wellbeing of low income
families. Underlying it all, however, was the
notion that housing is either a fundamental right,
or fundamentally good, which are related but
different things. The former notion best conveys
the spirit of post-War social activism, which
carried through to the antipoverty schemes of the
1960s and onward.
6
A Caveat on Home Ownership
The concept of home ownership as creating net
benefits to society beyond those enjoyed by the
homeower, as distinct from a social right or a
value-free market outcome, is not well accepted by
economists. While acknowledging that home
ownership is associated with positive characteristics,
such as community attachment, the likelihood of
voting, and local school and institutional support,
home ownership also introduces labour market
frictions. For example, the social and community
ties that bind and the search and transaction costs
associated with buying and selling houses militate
against job search when job prospects are poor
locally as opposed to elsewhere. This raises the cost
of unemployment and unemployment insurance,
and lowers productivity generally, because human
resources are not as tightly matched to opportunity
as they could be, if people were more mobile.
An extensive labour economics literature that
examines job mobility and unemployment
duration shows a range of labour market frictions
associated with home ownership (e.g., Green and
Hendershott 2002). The most common finding is
that home ownership imposes the costs associated
with reduced labour mobility, such as increased
unemployment (see Figure 1 for an illustrative
relationship, which highlights the correlation
between home ownership and unemployment in
Canada’s regions). Home ownership, while
conveying or associated with known social goods,
also conveys economic costs.
4 Much of the actuarial deficit was in practice recoverable.
5 A more current example of policy reflecting conflicted objectives is CMHC’s “green refund” program, which since 2005 has cut the cost of
mortgage default insurance for borrowers who pursue energy conservation at home. Using the price of mortgage default insurance to achieve
environmental or energy policy goals, as well as to deliver the thing itself (mortgage default insurance), is an example of what economists call
the Tinbergen problem (1952); meaning that to attach multiple goals to a single policy tool, in the expectation that more than one goal will
in fact be suitably addressed, makes suboptimal outcomes more likely than otherwise.
6 In 1973, housing minister Ron Basford declared housing to be a social right of Canadians and stated that CMHC would work in partnership
with the private sector and individual Canadians to maintain the high rate of housing starts that were characteristic of the early part of the
decade, as well as to increase the ability of low-income families to purchase homes. Basford also said that AHOP aimed “to show how,
through ownership, low-income households would improve their housing, and develop a greater stake in the community.” (Commons
Debates 1973 and Moscovitch and Germain 2006).| 4 Commentary 318
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Current Objectives and Activities 
Mortgage default insurance now forms the largest
part of CMHC’s activities, and the agency
dominates the domestic insurance market.
Dominating the market in Canada means that as
of 2010, CMHC insures mortgages worth
approximately $500 billion, almost the entire
Canadian mortgage insurance market.
7 These
guarantees expose taxpayers to the amount of the
insured mortgages less any recoveries through
foreclosures and deficiency judgments against
defaulted borrowers. While 100 percent of
CMHC’s mortgage insurance exposure is backed
by the credit of the Government of Canada, to
preserve a form of managed market competition,
the federal government backs 90 percent of the
private competitors’ insurance exposure.
The impact of CMHC’s dominance of the
mortgage insurance field, or the lack of
competition within it, is twofold. First, the range
of consumer choice is limited, clearly with respect
to choice of supplier, and also with respect to
price and the range of products offered (Mohindra
2010 discusses mortgage insurance offerings in
jurisdictions whose insurance markets are not
dominated by government suppliers; Londerville
2010 discusses the impact of competition on price).
The second aspect of this market concentration
is that a large proportion of the market risk
associated with housing finance becomes centred
on CMHC’s balance sheet. This is an issue, or
could readily become one, owing to the high
correlation of housing price trends among major
Canadian markets. The impact on taxpayers’
potential liabilities of a correlated negative
housing price shock depends entirely on CMHC’s
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insurance risk management practices, rather than
the diverse business models a competitive market
could produce. 
While a significant part of CMHC’s business is
aimed at social housing, the agency’s other
prominent activity is its mortgage purchase and
securitization programs (see Box 1). Under the
Canada Mortgage Bond program, initiated in
2001, the agency issues bonds, with principal and
interest guaranteed by the Government of Canada,
and uses the revenue from those bond sales to buy
mortgages from a range of domestic issuers. 
More recently, under the Insured Mortgage
Purchase Program, designed in response to the
2007-08 financial crisis, the Government of
Canada bought, from approved financial
institutions, pools of mortgage-backed securities
representing loans that CMHC already insured.
Accordingly, CMHC’s mortgage insurance
exposure and mortgage securities exposure are not
directly additive. (Figure 2 indicates the scale of
federal mortgage guarantees relative to national
income in Canada and, in the US, mortgages
owned or insured by the relevant agencies, which
are discussed below). 
The mortgage purchase program
8 was aimed at
improving the market perception of the quality of
assets held by domestic financial institutions by
moving pools of mortgages directly from financial
institutions’ books onto those of the federal
government. Banks and other financial
institutions would then more easily and cheaply
lend to each other and to nonfinancial institutions.
Market participants generally regard the program
as a success (Smith 2010, personal communication).
The United States Context 
The US government’s role in housing finance has,
more than in Canada, played out through income
tax policy, such as mortgage-interest deductibility
(MacGee 2010), yet government agencies there
have a longer history and even larger role in the
financial marketplace than they have had here.
Large, too, is the scale of the risks and the harm to
federal taxpayers and the financial marketplace. The
primary reason has been the US Congress’ explicit
desire to expand the securitization marketplace to
enhance the flow of funds to mortgage borrowers
on the assumption that this would lower the cost
to borrowers of home ownership, which tends
politically to be seen as good. To see how this
happened and why it became such a large problem
requires some institutional and political history.
The key US federal agency, the Federal National
Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, is a product
of the Great Depression and president Franklin
Roosevelt’s New Deal response. Chartered in 1938,
Fannie Mae’s two central aims were to express a
“national commitment” to housing and redress:
the inability or unwillingness of private lenders to ensure
a reliable supply of mortgage credit throughout the
country. The primary purpose of Fannie Mae was to
purchase, hold, or sell FHA [Federal Housing
Administration]-insured mortgage loans that had been
originated by private lenders. After World War II, Fannie
Mae’s authority was expanded to include VA [Veterans’
Administration]-guaranteed home mortgages.
9
During the agency’s early decades, the mortgage
market continued to be financed mainly through
household sector bank deposits. This changed in
1968, when the US Congress divided Fannie Mae
into the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae), which bought FHA
and VA guaranteed mortgages, and a reconstituted
and shareholder-owned Fannie Mae, which
bought pools of other mortgages. This change
toward conscious development of a secondary
mortgage market, or the development of a market
in securities backed by pools of residential
mortgages, was bolstered in 1970 when Congress
(through the agency known as the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board) created the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac,
which buys mortgage loans from member
institutions of the federal bank board (summary
liabilities through these agencies appear alongside
8 The program was initially capped at $75 billion and later increased to $125 billion, not all of which has been drawn on.
9 The Veterans Administration part of this home loan initiative matches CMHC’s origins. See
www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml?p=About+Fannie+Mae.| 6 Commentary 318
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Mortgage default insurance backstops residential mortgage lenders: if an insured borrower defaults on a
mortgage, the lender may force a foreclosure and sell the underlying asset (a residential property). If the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale do not cover the lending loss, the mortgage holder may recover its losses
from the mortgage insurer. In Canada, numeric regulations set the general terms of mortgage insurance:
federally regulated lenders are required to insure loans where the borrower’s downpayment is less than
20 percent of the purchase price. Current regulations also require that buyers put forward minimum
downpayments of 5 percent of the purchase price (although this amount may be borrowed) and limits
mortgage amortizations to lengths of 30 years or less.
CMHC, an agent Crown corporation, dominates mortgage insurance in Canada. There are
competitive entrants in the marketplace, such as, at present, Genworth Financial Canada and Canada
Guaranty Mortgage Insurance Company. These private insurers are able to compete at the edge of the
market, owing to a federal government guarantee of their obligations, less a deductible equal to 10
percent of the principal amount of the loans they insure. This guarantee enables private insurers to raise
capital at a cost similar to, but not lower than, CMHC, which enjoys 100 percent backing by the
Government of Canada. Details of these arrangements and their potential impact on the cost of
mortgage lending and insurance appear in Mohindra (2010) and Londerville (2010).
Panel A: Mortgage Default Insurance
The aim of securitization is to finely segment and better price the risks associated with lending. One
way is to issue financial instruments whose returns of interest and principal are backed by a parcel of
loans made by the securities’ issuer. One common structured securitized product is a financial
instrument comprised of slices of claims on other financial assets. These assets could be, for example,
credit card receivables held by a financial institution or pools of mortgage loans issued by a bank, trust
company or other lenders. 
Securities are often divided into tranches, wherein potential losses created by defaults associated with
the underlying assets are borne, up to a limit, by the first tranche and up to another, higher, limit by the
second tranche. In theory, this structure would leave the largest, core tranche with little likelihood of
bearing any losses. That is what enables large quantities of securities, based on a stream of income
derived from risky assets, to receive high (AAA) investment-grade ratings, thereby delivering funding to
borrowers at lower interest rates than otherwise possible.
Segmenting risk in this way enables better pricing and therefore arguably deeper and more liquid
financial markets and, by better allocating capital, should expand an economy’s production possibility
frontier. Note that an appropriately structured security, while improving the pricing of risk, also helps
financial intermediaries diversify risk across regions, across asset types, and across time, in the last case
by allowing the creation of securities with terms to maturity that suit market demand for financial
assets. Financial institutions are then able to lend more at low cost, while – in principle – prudently
protecting capital and better dispersing risks among lenders who choose to bear them.
Panel B: Securitization
Box1Commentary 318 | 7
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Canada’s in Figure 1; the history I describe relies
on Gerardi et al., 2007.)
Subsequent moves by Congress enacted a number
of accounting rule changes, primarily relaxing
regulations regarding how financial assets were
marked (on balance sheets) to market prices. It
also changed how banks and trust and loan
companies were regulated. In the wake of those
changes, coupled with new information technology
that facilitated the all-but-automatic processing of
mortgage loan applications, as well as changes in
the financial marketplace’s understanding of how
to price securities, the secondary mortgage
market, and the securitization business based 
on it, blossomed.
These changes, however, were or are not
sufficient to explain the past three decades’
explosion in US mortgage lending activity, or 
its pursuant implosion. That process required 
also the influence of the political dimension, 
as is familiar from Canada’s experience. US federal
legislation, for instance, compelled deposit-taking
institutions to lend fixed percentages of deposits
in the form of mortgage loans, back into the
regions from which the deposits were absorbed.
This social activism in federal policy dovetailed
with the view that home ownership was, by itself,
a social good, because its responsibilities would
encourage better behaviour on the part of residents
who owned their homes and were responsible for
paying mortgages that would allow them to stay in
those homes, and encourage stronger community
commitment (e.g., DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999).
10
This confluence of political interests, combined
with the financial incentives facing the company
managers who originated home mortgages,
packaged them or resold them or securities based
on them, muted the market signals that might
otherwise have mitigated the expansion of risk in
the financial system. And even when risks started
to emerge, as they did during the 1998 Asian
financial crisis, the political process suppressed
attention to risks and, instead, increased them,
contributing to the financial implosion that has
been detailed at length elsewhere. 
On continuing risks from federal home mortgage
insurance, for instance as offered through the
Federal Housing Administration and discussed
above: the FHA’s most recent actuarial review
(International Financial Engineering 2010) found
no likely near-term deficiencies in the ability of
the US government, through the FHA, to service
the mortgage loans it has guaranteed. An outside
review, however, found that the agency had
underestimated the number of borrowers who
were in economic trouble and likely to default,
underestimated likely future mortgage delinquencies,
and did not take into account how many of its
recent loans had been extended with downpayment
assistance – a class of loan that is especially likely
to default (Aragon et al., 2010). In other words,
the likelihood of more trouble in US mortgage
markets remains high. Whether these results are
definitive, the case is clear that US government
agencies’ roles in housing finance have generated
uncertain benefits while creating large costs and
continuing risks to taxpayers. 
None of this is to suggest that the financial
market risks present among the US GSEs
(government-sponsored enterprises), and which
have shown themselves previously in Canada, are
everpresent domestically. Mortgage lending and
housing finance markets, along with the
institutions that support them, differ in Canada
and the United States (MacGee 2010). What is
clear is that the scale of the housing market’s
financial risk is potentially large – what is less clear
is the degree of risk to which Canadian taxpayers
are potentially exposed. As I discuss later on, little
publicly is known about the specifics of the loan
quality that CMHC insures, and the agency is
subject to little formal monitoring. The questions
for Canadian policymakers are whether the costs
and risks are fully understood and whether future
risks might be more tightly monitored and limited,
while delivering on our housing policy goals.
C.D. Howe Institute
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The Continuing Case for Securitization and
Credit Default Insurance 
Notwithstanding its checkered history,
securitization can play a valuable role in
connecting saving with investment. That is
because when financial market risks can be
accurately assessed, and sold on to investors who
are willing to bear those risks in return for a
premium that suits them, the volume of financial
capital and the liquidity with which it is delivered
to those who need it is larger than otherwise 
(Box 1). Securitization allows financial risks to be
distributed regionally, sectorally and over time,
improving the productive efficiency of a given
amount of capital, and making it more readily
available and cheaper.
Redistributing and pricing risk is the essence 
of what financial markets do, and intervention in
them necessarily imposes costs. Conversely, when
markets that might manage a given class of risks
do not emerge, that too is a signal. One lesson
from the US housing market experience of the
past half-century is that when governments
intervene where risks do not seem to be priced
correctly, they may impose costs that are as large
as or larger than the perceived market failure
(Stiglitz 1981).
Likewise, when markets contain asymmetric
information, such as when mortgage lenders and
borrowers may profit from the other’s incorrect
assessment of a proposed transaction’s credit risks,
the potential for moral hazard exists. Such moral
hazard may lay the foundation for policy
intervention to impede or encourage transactions
of different types (Akerlof 1973). However, it is
unsafe to assume that policy intervention, such as
a government tax on a transaction or a subsidy to
encourage its consummation would improve social
outcomes (Dixit 1989).
Consider the generic question of whether banks
should sell off loans completely (as when issuers
sell pools of mortgages to institutional investors or
state agencies) or retain the loans on their books
and instead insure them against default. Even in
the presence of uncertainty about the quality of
those loans, or in the presence of moral hazard,
good social outcomes and profitability may be
achieved if well-capitalized banks are able to insure
loans and less well-capitalized banks may sell them
(Thompson 2007).
11
What Canada Should Do
Housing finance markets present significant and
undiversifiable risks that regularly have harmed
the broader economy, suggesting that an economic
case exists for some level of government
participation to achieve financial stabilization.
What I have sought in the foregoing is to establish
the existence of mortgage market risks to which
taxpayers are ultimately exposed and to highlight
previous Canadian and American failures to
properly manage those risks, with harmful
consequences. In the remaining section, I make
suggestions about how domestic policymakers
might do what is needed.
Wind Back on Mortgage Insurance
The Canadian mortgage default insurance market
includes domestic competitors and international
entrants, as discussed in Box 1. The corollary
observation is that the mortgage insurance market
is one that under normal conditions private
providers can serve. And the message from the
Canadian and US experience is that while federal
guarantees against mortgage default may facilitate
lending, that guarantee socializes risks that are
larger than they would have been absent a
government role.
The best way forward, therefore, is for CMHC
to limit growth in its mortgage insurance book,
the better to insulate taxpayers against risks that
they might neither wish nor need to share in.
Credit markets have moved closer to their normal
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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functioning since 2008, as evidenced for instance
by the declining spreads between the interest rates
at which major financial institutions borrow and
lend (IMF 2010). Accordingly, there is no reason
to assume that financial markets will not develop
to serve the credit-default insurance market. Policy
direction from the federal government should,
therefore, telegraph a phased withdrawal from the
mortgage insurance market so that private
providers may position themselves to serve emergent
market gaps.
It would be neither practical nor reasonable,
however, to suggest that CMHC vacate the
insurance market immediately or entirely. The
housing market has evolved in lockstep with the
financial institutions that support it. And potential
market risks are large, relative to any individual
firm that lends or insures home mortgages.
Moreover, lenders’, borrowers’, and insurers’ risk
assessments inevitably will be coloured by the
same information sets, meaning that at any point
they will have similarly rosy or cloudy views of the
likelihood of financial market trouble, and will
therefore mutually reinforce procyclical borrowing
and lending choices – fuelling booms and busts. 
Given this reality, prudent government policy
would direct CMHC to build itself only as a
federally backstopped reinsurer. The private sector
analogues are large reinsurance firms that reinsure,
among other things, trade, credit and similar
counterparty risk, including those involving
financial assets. At the same time, CMHC would
let its direct mortgage insurance and underwriting
book shrink through attrition. In other words, the
agency’s capital (and the skills of its managers)
would be deployed as a supplement to the private
mortgage lending and securitization markets. As
well, CMHC would enhance its capital by
collecting risk-adjusted reinsurance premiums
from the mortgage insurers who would grow to
serve the Canadian market and disperse the
associated risks more broadly and outside the
banking sector. 
In economic terms, CMHC would fulfill the
public function of taking on the undiversifiable
systemic risks that inevitably reside in large
financial markets such as the mortgage lending
and insurance business. In this scenario, CMHC
would not disappear – in fact, its capital might
grow – but its role would more clearly be limited
to securitization markets and diminish in
significance when domestic residential homebuyers
make their housing and borrowing choices.
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CMHC would for the time being continue its
direct engagement in the securitization market by
way of the Canada Housing Trust. The securities
it issued would be comprised of bundles of
privately insured mortgages, and CMHC’s role
would continue to be to ensure timely payments
defined by the terms of the securities. The overall
securitization role would be re-evaluated after the
financial marketplace had digested the other
changes described here.
The participation of more mortgage insurers
would introduce to the housing finance market
multiple risk management models. The
mechanisms that they chose in assembling their
insurance books would introduce a layer of
diversity which, in the face of correlated market
shocks, should reduce the impact of those shocks
on taxpayer liability. Moreover, more participation
from foreign insurers, as occurred after Australia
liberalized its mortgage insurance marketplace,
would help diversify financial market risks well
beyond Canadian borders, and the scope of
domestic undiversifiable risk exposure would in
fact shrink.
Meanwhile, the change in CMHC’s role could
enhance financial market stability, because the
reinsurance premiums that the agency collected
would be risk adjusted to match the loan quality
that insurers underwrite. Reinsurance premiums
could be set on a sliding scale that reflected the
risk profile of a firm’s assemblage of insured
mortgages: likely characteristics would be loan-to-
value ratios, the term structure of the mortgages
(fixed versus floating rate), and the average credit
scores of borrowers.
Accordingly, mortgage insurers that wished to
raise capital cheaply would retain appropriate
C.D. Howe Institute
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incentives to carefully limit the risks associated
with their lending so as to keep down their
insurance costs. They would have a larger market
to serve as the CMHC insurance book shrank. 
Market forces and sound prudential supervision
would ensure that private market insurers
adequately manage risks. Concern over the past
riskiness of the securitization marketplace could
be addressed by requiring issuers to place a
subordinated class of securities with a third party
(Allan and Bergevin, 2010).
Domestic implementation of international
standards with respect to capital adequacy, as such
rules apply to insurers, can provide the safety and
soundness Canadians expect from their financial
system. Appropriate capital adequacy
requirements, would eliminate the need for the
federal government’s 90 percent solvency
guarantee for private mortgage insurers. 
The obvious example of a successful government
retreat from the mortgage insurance market is
Australia (Mohindra 2010), which neither
backstops private insurers nor requires all high
loan-to-value borrowers to purchase mortgage
insurance. Nonetheless, many lenders request that
borrowers obtain insurance, which drives a vibrant
mortgage insurance market, and a securitization
business subsequently has grown in Australia,
based in significant part on insured mortgages.
Options for Implementation
Several options follow regarding for the shape of
CMHC’s future support for the mortgage
insurance market.
First, the agency would for the present continue
its program of purchasing bundles of mortgages
and selling bonds and securities based on them.
Subsequent steps would focus on maintaining a
vibrant securitization market. The agency’s familiarity
with the mortgage bond and securitization market
would enable it to serve as a central clearing party
for those securities.
Ultimately CMHC would stand as a clearing
house, or market-maker, for credit-default
obligations that stand behind mortgage-backed
securities. The goal would be to introduce layers
of protection, or to lay off, to private markets,
more of the credit risk associated with housing
finance. In so doing, less credit risk – of the type
now embedded in CMHC’s direct mortgage
insurance book – would redound to taxpayers in
the event of a negative housing market shock.
Indeed, the concept of developing of a
centralized counterparty, or clearing house for
standard derivatives such as credit default
obligations that hedge mortgage-backed securities,
is part of the financial stabilization agenda that
arose out of the recent round of G-20 meetings,
and would be consistent with Canada’s
implementation of that agenda (Koeppl 2011,
forthcoming). With such a counterparty in place
in Canada, CMHC’s active participation in the
securitization market would subsequently be
encouraged to wither.
Formalize OSFI Oversight 
The federal government’s main financial regulator,
the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSFI) does not oversee CMHC.
CMHC reports on the dollar value and the
characteristics of the pools of mortgages it buys
and securitizes, the revenue generated by its
mortgage insurance business and the extent to
which it manages impaired loans. (Impairments
eventually affect the agency’s net income). With
respect to capital set aside to manage losses on its
assets, CMHC reports that its holdings exceed
what OSFI would demand of similar businesses
that it does in fact regulate (CMHC 2010).
CMHC also regularly presents financial
statements that are audited by the Auditor
General for Canada, certifying that it operates
programs that are intended to address its
organizational mandate and does so within the
financial authority Parliament votes to it.
So far, so good. However, the Canadian public
neither has, nor can have under current reporting
arrangements, a complete understanding of the
risks to which they are exposed by way of CMHC’s
mortgage lending or insurance activities. Other
mortgage lenders and insurers must by law
comply with OSFI oversight and regulation with
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respect to capital adequacy, for example; CMHC
does not. OSFI officials are granted, as a courtesy,
access to CMHC’s financial arrangements
(CMHC 2010) and the potential risks to which
they are exposed are said to be manageable even in
the event of severe financial market stress
(personal communication, 2010). However,
Parliament and the voters to whom it answers
have no formal documentation of the way these
exposures are calculated or managed.
The resolution is simple: whether CMHC does
or does not wind back its direct mortgage
insurance operations, as I recommend above, it
should be required by legislation to comply with
OSFI oversight and regulation, including
establishing through public data disclosure that its
capital adequacy, with respect to mortgage
insurance activity, meets or exceeds the levels
demanded of privately operated insurers.
Introduce and Pass Covered Bond Legislation 
Supplementing the securitization market to
support new, competitive funding avenues is also
something Canada should support. For example,
Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s March 2010
federal budget included a paragraph introducing
the possibility that the government would table
legislation that would support, on a competitive
basis, the issuance by Canadian financial
institutions of bonds whose principal and interest
were fully covered by the stream of interest
income and principal repayments associated with
a pool of residential mortgages (Canada 2010).
The idea sounds unremarkable, and hardly
different from what financial institutions here and
elsewhere already do, yet it is very important.
Such a “covered” bond is backed by the full faith
and credit of the financial institution that issues it.
Further, in the event that the issuing financial
institution went bankrupt or was wound up,
covered bondholders would have priority not only
over other lenders and shareholders, as might be
expected, but also over domestic deposit insurance
providers. Financial institutions are able to borrow
money at very low cost, for that reason, and to
finance more and cheaper mortgages than they
otherwise could.
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The reason for taking this step is that it would
improve the ability of Canadian financial
institutions to raise low-cost capital in markets
that demand surety of repayment beyond what
corporate bonds otherwise offer. The covered
bond concept also answers directly to the
perceived risks sometimes associated with lengthy
chains of financial intermediation (Shin 2010).
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Objections 
The sort of mandate retrenchment I describe here,
with respect to CMHC, might face several objections. 
The first is that facilitating and encouraging
home ownership is a social good that requires
direct government participation in the marketplace.
However, the evidence on this point is weak. The
activities certainly have generated significant risks
to the taxpayer and, at times as in the US, large,
centralized risks to overall financial stability.
Moreover, to the extent that affordable home
ownership is a social good and one that requires
the availability of mortgage insurance, it does not
follow that government needs to provide it directly.
Rules governing the availability of mortgages and
requirements for mortgage insurance can exist in
regulation and legislation, as they do now, without
requiring that the government stand ready to be
the direct mortgage insurer.
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A second objection is the worry that private
mortgage insurers might be disinclined to serve
rural and remote areas. As discussed earlier,
promoting home ownership in rural areas is likely
not a health policy stance, owing to the mobility
costs it potentially creates. However, if the
availability of mortgage insurance is a political
imperative, the question policy should address is
why private markets might fail to serve rural areas.
It may be because sparse regions are costly to
serve, or because regional risk characteristics make
some insurance markets unattractive. If sparseness
is the cause, then technology and online validation
and sales tools may be part of the answer. If the
problem is low profitability for risk reasons,
another resolution would be to impose
performance mandates on mortgage insurers when
they obtain from OSFI their licenses to operate,
or insurance offered in rural and remote areas
could be subsidized by CMHC. Again, this would
not require CMHC directly to provide the
insurance.
A third potential objection is that the recent
financial crisis has demonstrated the requirement
for significant government engagement in
mortgage markets, owing mostly to their size.
Such government involvement, so the argument
goes, permitted agencies to purchase mortgage
assets directly from financial institutions in an
effort to enhance credit market liquidity by
improving the asset quality of those private
institutions. In other words, CMHC ought to
exist as currently constituted because it contributed to
financial stability at a time of crisis. However, even
if all the steps I recommend here are taken, nothing
would stop a government from undertaking similar
asset purchases in future, should the need become
apparent. It certainly would not require the federal
government to be directly engaged in providing
mortgage insurance.
The last concern, with respect to covered bonds,
is the risks associated with their potential liabilities
and the fact that if covered bondholders stand at
the front of the line in the event of the bankruptcy
of the issuer, others, such as deposit insurers, will
bear larger costs. However, the risks and potential
costs can be made very small, by requiring covered
bond pools to be overcollateralized, and by creating
them using only uninsured, low loan-to-value
ratio mortgages – making their credit ratings very
high and the likelihood of their failing to repay
very low. This is what international financial
markets are already producing and, accordingly,
covered bonds trade with very low risk premiums.
Conclusions 
This Commentary’s message is simple: the
Canadian and US experience illustrates some of
the large financial sector problems and taxpayer
risks associated with government agencies’
participation in the mortgage lending market. As a
practical matter, however, the Government of
Canada is unlikely to withdraw its direct and
indirect support of mortgage markets. In the face
of these facts, clear recommendations follow.
Federal policy should limit public exposure to
mortgage lending risks, by winding back CMHC’s
role in providing mortgage insurance, and
allowing private providers to take on a larger role.
The agency’s capital and staff would be well
employed in a reinsurance function that backed
private market insurers.
Independent of whether Ottawa pursues this
recommendation, Parliament should adopt
legislation that formally requires CMHC to
comply with and report on compliance with
OSFI guidelines.
Finally, Parliament should adopt legislation that
would support covered bond issuance by domestic
financial institutions and clarify creditor
arrangements in the event of the bankruptcy of a
federally regulated deposit-taking institution. Such
legislation would allow those institutions to more
readily compete for low-cost capital in the
international bond market and better serve the
domestic mortgage lending market.
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